Sudan 1885 Read online

  From a total population of about seven million, 2000 men were chosen by ballot each year, as the army needed that many recruits annually to maintain its establishment, with conscripts serving terms of four years. Like conscription everywhere, service was not popular, and the calibre of most recruits was poor.

  Apart from two small victories in May 1882, the army rarely enjoyed any success in the field. In 1883-84 its morale was poor, training was inadequate, and much of its leadership was wanting. However, the situation changed over the next twelve months with the assistance of British officers. While the senior officers of the Egyptian army were all seconded from the British army, it retained its Ottoman rank structure, and drill orders were given in Turkish. The commander held the title of Sirdar. In 1885 Sir Francis Grenfell held this office. He had initially worked under Wood before becoming Sirdar in April.

  The Egyptian army was not deployed fully in the field until December 1885. By then its strength was nine infantry battalions, eight troops of cavalry, four batteries of artillery, and three companies of the Camel Corps, totalling in all 29 British officers, 224 Egyptian officers, and 6786 men. Their first significant action once deployed in the desert was in support of a British force at Abu Klea on 17 January 1885. The Egyptian army eventually became a force to be reckoned with, and much later, in 1898, it played a central role in the recapture of Khartoum under General Sir Herbert Kitchener.

  THE BRITISH ARMY AT HOME AND ABROAD

  While Britain’s army had not engaged a continental enemy since the Crimean War, this was not the case on the borders of its colonial empire. During the last third of the nineteenth century alone, the Victorian army was involved in colonial warfare every year except 1883.

  These conflicts differed greatly, depending on the tactics, weaponry and fighting ability of the enemy. In most cases British forces triumphed, but there were some notable exceptions. British victories came as a result of superior command and control, discipline, and sophisticated logistics arrangements.

  Britain also had another huge military asset in its Indian army. While this was designed to police India and its borders, it was a source of troops in case of emergency. As they would in 1915, Indian units served in the Sudan alongside Australian troops, while Indian camel drivers and labourers were valuable logistics assets during this campaign.

  Wolseley and other reformers within the British army saw that European armies, such as that of Prussia, were gaining an edge over a British army shackled by an unimaginative and conservative high command. There were also fundamental weaknesses. For example, there was no plan for mobilising home-based forces. There would be no major review of the armed forces until 1886, after the Sudan campaign of 1885. However during the 1880s Wolseley, while Adjutant-General, pushed the government to articulate for the first time exactly what it wanted its army to do.

  To help his political masters Wolseley, a very experienced soldier, proposed several priorities for Britain’s professional army. These were to:

    •  provide aid to the civil power;

    •  garrison India;

    •  provide a home defence capability; and

    •  be ready to deploy two army corps to any European war (considered a highly unlikely contingency).

  It was the second priority that consumed British military assets, and the price was a permanently under-strength home army. It had long been a key policy of all British governments that the northwest frontier of India had to be protected against any threat from imperial Russia.

  Therefore, under Wolseley’s four military priorities, the British army could find itself fighting in three different types of war:

    •  campaigns of conquest or annexation;

    •  campaigns to suppress insurrections; or

    •  punitive expeditions to avenge a wrong or overthrow a dangerous enemy.

  The Sudan campaign was an example of the last type, but in fulfilling a short-term political objective (such as the Egyptian War in 1882), some of these priorities could result in a permanent occupation, even if Britain had no wish to stay in a country.

  The authority and process for deploying British troops to overseas campaigns or in response to colonial crises were complex. By law, no soldier could serve overseas until he had completed one year of service, and Parliament could not mobilise the reserve, except in a national emergency. Therefore small expeditionary forces could be found only by withdrawing troops from either the Indian army or colonial garrisons. The self-governing colonies gradually became parts of an imperial strategic asset, and the New South Wales Contingent of 1885 was one of the earliest examples of this.

  Difficulties did not end once formation of a force was authorised. As the British army had no general staff system, strategic planning and command were potential weaknesses. Under the War Office Act (1870), once Cabinet approved an operation, the Secretary of State for War became politically responsible for it. In planning a campaign, however, he might have to collaborate with the First Lord of the Admiralty, the Colonial Secretary, and the Secretary of State for India. This was messy and inefficient.

  As there was no general staff, it was difficult for an army commander to collect and analyse information and intelligence, prepare operational plans, identify and select qualified officers, and then liaise with the Royal Navy and plan logistics support. While on overseas campaigns the army could call upon the expertise and assets of the navy, which could provide transport, seize and hold bridgeheads, initiate coastal bombardments and assist in small-scale estuarine or riverine operations.

  Senior commanders like Wolseley had little choice other than to select their own trusted circle of commanders and staff officers based on personal friendships, proven qualities, and experience. While this was a hit-and-miss method, it seemed to work during the period of the Egyptian and Sudan campaigns. Wolseley recognised the flaws in his own system of command, but there was no real alternative open to him.

  The advantages of such a structure were cohesion and continuity among subordinate staff, while allowing these officers to gain field experience. The downsides were that the staff became self-opinionated, while talented younger officers were denied opportunities for command in the field. This would have consequences for some aspects of the Sudan campaign.

  For example, in 1884, instead of deploying their force overland from Suakin to Berber, senior staff officers, including Wolseley, chose to deploy along the Nile River. Their decision was based on their personal experience campaigning along Canada’s rivers in 1860-70. In making this decision they ignored the advice of the army’s own intelligence branch, the advice of the military staff in Cairo, and specialist officers.

  GENERAL SIR GARNET WOLSELEY, KP, GCB, OM, GCMG, VD, PC

  Wolseley entered the army as second lieutenant in 1852 and fought with distinction in the Second Anglo-Burmese War, the Crimean War, and the Indian Mutiny. Despite suffering wounds which cost him the sight of one eye, Wolseley was gazetted the youngest lieutenant colonel in the British army, he was 25.

  Popular with the British public and a highly efficient commander he was employed by successive governments as chief trouble shooter of the British Empire. In 1873 he was sent to West Africa to lead a punitive expedition against the Asante (Ashanti) empire. Two years later he was sent to Natal in southern Africa. In 1879 he was given command in South Africa. After restoring order in Zululand, he moved on to the Transvaal, where he discouraged rebellion among the Boers.

  In 1884, Wolseley organized and headed an expedition to the Nile to rescue his friend General Charles Gordon, besieged at Khartoum in the Sudan. An advance party arrived on Jan. 28, 1885, two days after the city had fallen and Gordon had been killed. Wolseley was elevated to viscount.

  In 1890 he became a field marshal, then in 1895 commander in chief of all Britain’s forces.

  Source: Wikipedia Commons.

  In the British army infantry regiments doctrinally consisted of batt
alions (each of which had eight companies of 120 men each). Cavalry regiments generally had four squadrons each of 113 men, while artillery batteries had 137 men. Most of the troops deployed to Egypt and the Sudan were sent as part of small expeditionary forces (Wolseley’s force for the attack on Cairo in 1882 was exceptionally large). They were organized in brigades, a formation too small to deal effectively with a ferocious and mobile force such as the Mahdi had at his disposal.

  At this time the non-arms component of the British army was becoming more important. This was especially the case for the Royal Engineers. Several campaign commanders in Egypt were engineer officers (for example General Sir Gerald Graham, VC at Suakin and later Kitchener at Khartoum). This was a recognition not only of the increasing complexity of war fighting, but also of the diverse operational environment in which the army found itself, from India to Africa.

  Specialised units such as the 10th Railway Company, RE, which deployed to Suakin, were becoming more common. So too was the use of modern equipment such as observation balloons, the telegraph, and the locomotive.

  The Army Service Corps was also becoming more important (and efficient) in supplying and sustaining forces in the field. The Sudan campaign posed new challenges in the procurement and maintenance of vast numbers of camels and the supply of water for troops. These challenges were not always met successfully. The Ordnance Supply Store was responsible for the storage and issue of all military stores and equipment (other than rations and animals) and artillery supply in rear areas. More attention was given to soldiers’ welfare, and the Army Postal Corps was established, while punishment by the use of the lash had been abolished in 1881.

  Another branch that had undergone real change up to this time was the Army Medical Service. It had more equipment, and generally this was of a better standard than in earlier years. Training was becoming more professional, which not only meant better facilities (several hospital ships were made available for this campaign), but also more uniform treatment of wounded or sick soldiers.

  Deployed British forces were under close scrutiny from another new element: press correspondents, a number of whom accompanied various British formations in the Sudan. Then, as now, they vexed commanders in the field.

  Infantry

  In Europe the traditional square and file formations that had delivered withering volley fire for over a century were giving way to more sophisticated tactics. Many countries had closely studied the tactics used in the American Civil War (1861-65), but had found them wanting. At a higher strategic level, planning increasingly took advantage of new technologies: steam engines, the railway, the telegraph, and mass production methods. In colonial wars, however, Britain’s army still employed the square (see page 18-19) against tribes that generally were poorly armed and disciplined, and had limited means to sustain a force of any size in the field.

  In India and Africa the old tactics could still be used effectively, including against a numerically superior enemy. They could exploit one of the key strengths of the British army – discipline. In its favour, volley fire provided the maximum application of lethal force by non-automatic weapons, it maximised the conservation of ammunition, and could be delivered at one word of command until an enemy was well within range. Members of the New South Wales Contingent practised these skills.

  There was nothing especially sophisticated about operations in Egypt and the Sudan, and almost all infantry advances in the field in the Sudan were carried out in tight, traditional formations. On meeting the enemy, fighting tactics employed a hollow square. If time allowed, commanders would try to organise their force into two squares in echelon, which would enable mutually supporting fire from each to cover the flanks of the other. If available, artillery or Gatling or Gardner guns were placed in the corners of these squares. This came with risks, as these weapons were liable to be rushed by the enemy.

  ‘According to the best authorities squares are only to be used when you cannot protect your flanks and rear by any other formation against an enemy who employs shock tactics; therefore, in these days of long-ranging arms of precision, squares should rarely be used against cavalry, as that arm requires open country to charge over, so that the best defence for infantry would be as complete a development of fire as possible. Thick bush of course neutralizes the advantage of long-range aimed fire, and with a rapid daring enemy like the Soudanese, compels the troops to maintain a formation which will always protect their flanks and rear. The objection to having separate bodies in echelon, either in line or square, in bush or broken ground, where the enemy can get in between, is that the separated portions of the troops are liable to fire into each other. This actually happened at Tamai in March 1884, when the two brigades were in separate formations, but happily without serious results.’

  Lieutenant General Sir Gerald Graham, VC

  Address to the Royal United Services Institute, 26 February, 1886

  As we will see, tribesmen were quick to identify a weakness in the square formation - its corners. The other weakness in using a square, rather than a line, was the difficulty of organising an infantry charge from it. As most artillery and small guns in this campaign were pushed and pulled by hand, any square could rapidly become disorganised due to rough ground or the slow speed of artillery moving on one of the sides of the square.

  British arms were not always successful, and several disasters in Egypt and the Sudan between 1882 and 1885 proved this. These losses could be traced to poor intelligence, incompetent command, lack of water, or poor management of artillery assets. Local leaders were a force to be reckoned with, and Osman Digna is an outstanding example. They were not only charismatic, but were adept at exploiting superior local knowledge, mobility, stealth and the unique strengths of their forces.

  Private Tom Gunning, a member of the New South Wales Contingent, later recalled that in the Sudan, their enemy sometimes outmatched the contingent’s weapons.

  … surprising as it may seem, they were equipped with better arms than the British. Each man had a range of weapons which chilled the blood of many a Guardsman. In the first place they each carried an American Remington rifle a far more effective weapon than ours. This was supplemented by two spears, a throwing stick shaped something like a boomerang and a terrible hamstringing knife-dagger in the form of a capital J, the size of a large carving knife and razor sharp on every edge. To this formidable kit of tools was added a shield, altogether a strange and deadly outfit combining the old and the new.

  British infantryman near Suakin, contemporary sketch. The sword suggests a mounted infantry man. Rarely would soliders appear as neat as this in the field. Source: John Grant, Cassell’s History of the War in the Soudan, Volume IV, Cassell, London, 1885, p. 84.

  THE BRITISH ‘SQUARE’: THEORY AND PRACTICE

  The British ‘square’ is well known to tacticians, historians and movie goers, but the term can be misleading. During the Sudan campaign it could more accurately be termed an oblong or quadrant. The formation was probably the only one imperial forces could use there, given the type of enemy, the relatively small size of friendly forces engaged, and the terrain. In most of the key battles in the Sudan campaign of 1882-85, the use of the square as a defensive measure came with risks. Camel transport also could cause the square formation to break up as forces moved either to engage the enemy, or as different parts of the formation tried to keep pace in resupply convoys.

  If a square was broken or penetrated the force could be wiped out, and if it was broken the confused hand-to-hand fighting which usually followed caused heavy losses to man and beast through friendly fire. When the formation was more linear, however, it was less exposed to such risks. The diagram on the next page illustrates very broadly how square, quadrate and linear formations were actually used in several battles over the campaign.

  At the battle of El Teb the square, composed of six infantry battalions with Royal Engineers and the Naval Brigade, passed along the enemy’s front exposed to inaccurate rifle and arti
llery fire, before breaking into two irregular lines, which then successfully drove the Mahdists from their position. In this battle it was linear tactics that decided the outcome. In the advance a quarter, or at most half, of the attacking force could use their rifles. The advancing square had a front of some 365 metres when it was attacked on both sides.

  During the battle of Tamai, 4300 troops were formed in two squares. While the breadth of the attack was wider than at El Teb, the space between them was also 365 metres. Still, only one quarter of the men could fire to check the enemy rush. The leading square broke after it attempted to charge with its front face. Its flanks and rear could not conform to the movement with sufficient speed. The second square, which increased the frontage of the line of battle, was here most vulnerable, including from fire from its neighbouring square.

  As noted, the use of a square was unavoidable where a small force was operating in isolation against superior enemy numbers. At the battle of Abu Klea the British square of 1400 soldiers, two deep with a frontage of 350 men, was partly penetrated, as the Mahdists did not take long to identify this as a key vulnerability in the British tactical formation. There the rear face of the square was opened, causing one of the flank forces to face about to meet the inrushing enemy.

  At Kirbekan, as we shall see, the attack seems to have been linear, and was completely successful. Held in front by guns and two infantry companies, the enemy position was carried by an assault in line against the Mahdists’ right flank, while their one decisive charge (by spearmen) was effectively blocked.

  After the experience in the Sudan, British military tacticians debated the best way to deploy infantry in a square. One school of thought suggested that theoretically the best formation would be one that:

    •  could develop a heavy fire, so as to sweep away an enemy attack before it could close;