Sudan 1885 Read online

  26 May:

  the fort of Berber surrenders

  14 June:

  British consider the construction of a railway from Suakin to assist the relief effort

  26 August:

  command of the relief expedition given to General Lord Wolseley

  9 September:

  Wolseley arrives in Cairo

  11 September:

  Egyptian forces win at the battle of Korti

  16 December:

  British field headquarters established at Korti on the Nile

  30 December:

  proposal to send a second expedition by sea to Suakin

  1885

  17 January:

  General Stewart defeats an enemy force at the battle of Abu Klea

  5 February:

  news arrives in London of the fall of Khartoum

  6 February:

  news arrives in Australia of the death of Gordon

  10 February:

  Battle of Kirbekan, on the Nile

  20 February:

  Graham appointed to command the Suakin Field Force

  3 March:

  the New South Wales Contingent embarks on the Australasian and the Iberia in Sydney

  8 March:

  the Desert Column advances to Korti

  20 March:

  General McNeill’s force successfully engages the enemy at the battle of Hashin

  22 March:

  attack on McNeill’s Zareba

  29 March:

  arrival of the first part of the New South Wales Contingent in Suakin

  30 March:

  arrival of the second part of the New South Wales Contingent in Suakin

  2 April:

  the New South Wales Contingent marches to Tamai and sees its first action

  6 April:

  New South Wales infantry come under fire for the first time

  8 April:

  Handoub occupied by British and Australian troops

  16 April:

  Otao occupied

  19 April:

  Tambuk occupied

  1 May:

  first Australian military casualty on oversees service

  11 May:

  the British government orders the evacuation of all imperial and Egyptian

  troops from the Sudan

  17 May:

  New South Wales troops (minus horses) re-embark from Suakin on the Arab

  23 June:

  the New South Wales Contingent arrives in Sydney

  Chapter 1

  BACKGROUND

  BRITAIN, EUROPE AND EGYPT

  At the start of the last quarter of the nineteenth century, Egypt was a political and economic ‘basket case’. It was part of the crumbling Ottoman Empire, under the nominal control of the Sultan in Constantinople (Istanbul). Once rich and stable, its government was corrupt, and had alienated many minority groups. This alienation applied particularly to Egypt’s southernmost province, the Sudan.

  Egypt was ruled from Cairo by a Khedive, Ismail Pasha. He had ascended the throne in 1863, and then proceeded to bankrupt the country through a lavish lifestyle and taking poor financial advice. Development of a power vacuum was a matter of time in this strategically important part of the Middle East. European powers, jealous of their own interests, and with an eye to exploiting the situation while also trying to maintain regional stability, were soon drawn to the country.

  The Khedive Ismail Pasha. Source: Wikipedia Commons.

  In the decade following the completion of the French-built Suez Canal, Egypt’s debt spiralled out of control, and both the British and French governments were determined to recover the money owed to the international community. As a result, in 1872 an Anglo-French dual control system had been established to manage Egypt’s finances, and to place the country on a sound economic footing. Both countries effectively collected taxes from the Egyptian population, to the outrage of the citizens. Half of Egypt’s entire revenue went to other countries.

  The Suez Canal, cutting the long sea voyage around South Africa’s Cape of Good Hope, became a strategic asset for both France and Britain. It had particular importance as a vital imperial supply route for the British, as the travel time to India was much shorter. In 1876 Egypt’s debt crisis became so bad that Ismail Pasha sold his shares in the canal to Britain.

  The economic and political situation in Cairo continued to deteriorate. This economic disaster damaged the Egyptian army. Due to the financial situation, most of the army’s Turkish and Egyptian officers were on half pay, and this triggered a series of mutinies. The Khedive was forced to step down.

  After an internal power struggle, in January 1882 Britain and France intervened to support him. A coup d’état followed, and 50 Europeans were killed in riots in the port of Alexandria. This led to the Egyptian War of 1882.

  The nationalist commander of the Egyptian army, Arabi Pasha, effectively took control of Egypt and began to restore the fortifications around Alexandria. The British and French governments responded by deploying a combined squadron of warships to the region. Ismail’s son, Tewfik Pasha, unsuccessfully tried to dismiss Arabi. The British naval commander, in an act not supported by his French ally, sent an ultimatum: Arabi had to disarm the forts or suffer naval bombardment. All French warships then withdrew.

  HMS Condor during the bombardment of Alexandria in 1882. Source: Wikipedia Commons.

  Warships off Alexandria. Sudan sketch by Frederic Villiers for the Graphic supplement 24 July 1882.

  Source: Graphic supplement 24 July 1882, National Library of Australia.

  On 10 July 1882 British battleships began to bombard the port of Alexandria and the eight forts along its harbour. This was a strategic disaster, as the only effect was to initiate an open revolt in Egypt against British rule, while politically alienating the French and Ottoman governments. Britain’s interference in Egypt was a reversal of its traditional foreign policy in Africa. Britain began to substitute annexation for the old methods of indirect rule. So, when Britain deployed its forces in Egypt and the Sudan, it did so against its own best interests and its international strategic policy.

  The fallout from the bombardment of Alexandria forced the government in London to deploy its army to restore order in Egypt. Hastily, Britain put together a force. Troops were sourced from garrisons around Britain, the Mediterranean, and as a far away as India, while the entire available army reserve of almost 12,000 men was called up. In an effort to protect the Suez Canal a mainly British force of 20,000 troops, led by Lieutenant General Sir (later Lord) Garnet Wolseley landed half way along the canal and, after fighting a battle at Tel-el-Kebir, occupied Cairo in September 1882.

  This was not done without difficulties, including:

    •  the lack of water, which almost doomed the entire expedition;

    •  poor and inadequate medical arrangements (cholera took a heavy toll) and ambulance transport; and

    •  sub-standard rations.

  Wolseley, a highly experienced and competent soldier, learned from these errors, and the British were generally better prepared in all these matters during their subsequent campaigns An Islamist state since the fourteenth century, the Sudan had been a source of slaves for hundreds of years. Since 1820 this massive but wild and unruly region of more than 25 million square kilometres had been ruled from Cairo, but this administration was as corrupt as it was inefficient. Khartoum, strategically situated near the confluence of the Blue and White Nile Rivers, had been the provincial seat of government since 1838.

  MOHAMMED TEWFIK, KHEDIVE OF EGYPT,

  Mohammed Tewfik, Khedive of Egypt, 1879- 1892, contemporary sketch. Source: Wikipedia Commons.

  As a result of British intervention, Tewfik was installed as Khedive in Cairo. He acceded to office when his father, Ismail Pasha, was deposed. From Constantinople the Ottoman sultan appointed Tawfiq khedive in June 1879 by which time Ismail had brought Egypt to the brink of bankruptcy.

  T
he British had little understanding, however, of the complexity of Egyptian finances, society and politics. Part of this complicated political landscape was Egypt’s southern province of the Sudan, which boiled over in open revolt under a local radical Islamist leader (the Mahdi) while Wolseley was advancing to Cairo. The Mahdi was calling for jihad, and the instability this revolt caused led to another financial crisis in Egypt in 1884.

  The Egyptian government tried to control the province through garrisons in small forts scattered across the region. From the early 1880s forces loyal to the Mahdi overran most of the forts in what was not only a jihad, but also a revolt against corrupt central rule from Cairo.

  Well before this period Colonel Charles Gordon, a British army officer, had been appointed Governor of Khartoum in March 1874. He had cemented his place in the British public’s imagination by suppressing the Taiping Rebellion in China in 1863, and later crushing the slave trade in the Sudan. He was also responsible for all Egyptian territories outside Egypt: the Equatorial Provinces, Darfur, and the Red Sea and Somali coasts.

  Under Gordon the Upper Nile region as far as the borders of Uganda came under Egyptian control. He remained in the Sudan until August 1879, and made strenuous efforts to crush the slave trade, but was frustrated by the inaction of Egyptian authorities.

  Despite efforts to promote agriculture and open up communications, the province was a constant drain on the Egyptian treasury. Resentment simmered among local tribes, which had derived their livelihood from slavery. A plan for the reorganisation and better administration of the Sudan was considered between 1880 and 1882, but the actions of the charismatic Mahdi prevented any scheme being realised.

  Gordon returned to the Sudan in 1884. He then directly disobeyed orders by not evacuating Egyptian garrisons there, and further inflamed the situation by challenging the Mahdi.

  After Gordon was besieged in Khartoum, Queen Victoria, the public outcry, and the threatened resignation of the Secretary of State for War forced the hand of the British government. At the last moment, and after much indecision, Prime Minister William Gladstone had to approve the budget for a relief expedition, which arrived two days too late to save Gordon.

  General Charles Gordon. Source: Wikipedia Commons.

  The murder of Gordon in Khartoum in 1885 saw outpourings of grief across the empire, but his death was largely of his own doing. The British government, however, could be excused for not mourning his passing. For his part, the Mahdi had not wanted Gordon dead, as he had planned to use him in a prisoner exchange.

  At the time the New South Wales Contingent set sail for the Sudan imperial values (at least for the empire’s white subjects) were firmly Christian. This was of a militant nature and, since the Indian Mutiny, had been cleverly exploited by both the British government and the military. This partly explains the super-star status of the pious Gordon.

  William Gladstone, 1809-1898. Served as Prime Minister of Great Britain on four occasions (1868-74, 1880-85, six months in 1886 and from 1892-94). Source: Wikipedia Commons.

  The death of General Gordon on the steps of his palace in Khartoum, 26 January 1885 - a highly stylised depiction of his last moments. Source: Wikipedia Commons.

  THE MAHDI AND JIHAD

  In the 1870s a self-styled but charismatic local prophet, a Nile boat builder and religious fanatic named Muhammad Ahmad, proclaimed himself the Mahdi – ‘the Guided One’. By 1881 he withdrew west to Kordofan near Darfur, after defeating two attempts to arrest him by the provincial governor in Khartoum. By 1883 the first of a series of British-led expeditions to crush the revolt was being planned.

  The Mahdi vowed to drive all Turks, Egyptians, and Europeans out of the Sudan, while maintaining the province as an Islamist state. An autocratic but charismatic figure, he rapidly gathered a huge following and called for a jihad, or holy war, against the Egyptian and Ottoman governments, and against Europeans. Ultra-conservative Islam of the type characterised today by the Taliban shaped his world-view.

  Soon, thousands of local warriors (also known as Dervishes) and other tribes such as the Beja people (one of the Sudan’s largest Muslim groups), who had for years suffered under the oppressive rule of Egypt, flocked to join the Mahdi. The Beja were one of two broad multi-tribal groups supporting him. They were divided into three tribes. One of these was the Hadendowa, who lived around Suakin and the coastal areas.

  The Mahdist movement drew its strength from:

    •  the oppression under which people suffered, particularly in the Sudan, and

    •  the measures taken to prevent the Baggara (cattle-owning tribes) from slave trading.

  Both Egyptian and British authorities vastly underestimated the Mahdi’s abilities as a leader. He had studied the history of Islam, and drew whatever lessons it had for him in terms of waging war. A patient man, he could exploit a tactical situation by bringing to bear a massive and very fast attack on an unwary opponent. Invariably this would catch his enemy off guard, so that the Mahdi’s troops could exploit the resulting surprise and panic.

  MAHDIST SOLDIERS

  Sudan: Mahdist Soldiers.

  The Hadendowa supplied the Mahdi, and later Osman Digna, with both cavalry and ‘mounted infantry’. These were usually armed with traditional weapons (swords and spears), but some had recently captured breech-loading rifles; a few were deserters from the Egyptian army. As the rebellion grew, captured Egyptian artillery (and artillerymen) added to their firepower.

  In response to the threat posed to his authority, Tewfik undertook several unsuccessful campaigns against the Mahdi. Two Egyptian forces under former British army officers, William Hicks Pasha and Valentine Baker Pasha, were routed on 5 November 1883 and 4 February 1884.

  Sensing a powerful leader on the rise a former fruit merchant and later slave trader, Osman Digna, supported by the Beja tribe, became one of the Mahdi’s most resourceful commanders. His power base was in the east of the province around Suakin, along the hinterland of the Red Sea. Together these two men wreaked havoc in the Sudan for the next 15 years. Osman Digna, however, never led his troops, preferring to remain elsewhere in prayer. Fanaticism, canny leadership, and highly skilled guerrilla tactics became a potent military mix. The infantry of the New South Wales Contingent fired their first shots against Osman Digna’s forces.

  The Hadendowa preferred guerrilla tactics, using long-range rifle fire from cover if rifles were available, or close hand-to-hand combat with traditional weapons if they were not. These warriors, nicknamed by British troops Dervishes in the east or Fuzzy Wuzzies around Suakin, were fast and ferocious, and masters of stealth and camouflage. Their ability to use ground and to take advantage of the dark or smoke from burning scrub enabled them to mass undetected within metres of a camp perimeter. Members of the New South Wales Contingent experienced this first hand in their own camp at Suakin.

  Under the Mahdi, his army gradually evolved from 1881 as groups of ansar (followers), grew in the west. By late 1882 they were divided into several formations called standards, each of which was commanded by a Khalifa appointed directly by the Mahdi. The three Khalifas each commanded a flag or rayya – black (from the west), red (from the Nile areas north of Khartoum) and green (from tribes to the south of Khartoum). There were other forces that the Mahdi could draw on, but these were tribal warriors commanded by their own local sheiks or emirs. The development of the ansar was a tactical response to make best use of the growing numbers of tribes who rallied to the Mahdi’s banner.

  Muhammad Ahmad bin Abd Allah, the Mahdi 1844-1885. Source: Wikipedia Commons.

  In the east the tribesmen under Osman Digna were more loosely organised, and each tribe fought under its own sheik or emir. Across the Sudan mounted tribesmen were responsible for reconnaissance, harassing lines of communications, and later for disrupting railway construction to the west of Suakin.

  The Mahdi had attracted several thousand militia riflemen from south Sudan to his cause. Known as Jihadiya, they wer
e not Arabs. They were often skilfully used in groups of about 20, as part of larger formations. They were armed with ancient muzzle loaded rifles or simple, but effective, spears. From 1883 they increasingly used captured weapons such as more modern Remington rifles. During a number of battles captured artillery and artillerymen were also brought into play against British formations.

  Unless mounted, Mahdists often left a battle or skirmish slowly and in good order. More than once British commanders misinterpreted this movement as a retreat, with disastrous consequences for pursuing cavalry units. A favourite tactic, particularly of the Beja, was to lie on the ground while a cavalryman rode past, then hamstring the horse and bring down its rider. The country around Suakin and elsewhere was ideal for this type of fighting.

  Another tactic was to bring overwhelming force to bear on a corner of the traditional British square, and then wedge it open, allowing massed tribesmen to flow into and widen the resulting gap. British tactical thinking had to become more flexible and innovative if this elusive enemy was to be beaten.

  THE EGYPTIAN ARMY

  The Egyptian army had been disbanded in the aftermath of the Anglo-Egyptian War of 1882. It was re-established as a conscript army in the following year, with a total of 6000 men formed in eight battalions. Its new Commander-in-Chief was British Major General Sir Evelyn Wood, VC. In 1885 it was still being reorganised with the assistance of British military advisors.