Sudan 1885 Page 7

  Osman Digna, one of the Mahdi’s most effective lieutenants. Source: John Grant, Cassell’s History of the War in the Soudan, Volume V, Cassell, London, 1885, p. 84.

  Osman Digna

  On the advice of Gordon in Khartoum, Graham opened peace negotiations in Suakin. A letter was circulated to all the local tribal emirs asking them to agree to disperse their forces. The deadline of 29 February passed with no response.

  Graham knew that the enemy had entrenched at El Teb, supported by artillery captured from Baker’s force. He wasted no time, and ordered an immediate advance to recapture Tokar and Sinkat. Graham led an advance party to a site known as Fort Baker, about 10 kilometres south of Suakin, intending to use this as a forward base. Short marching distances between defensive posts like this one were essential in the hot desert climate.

  Fort Baker had been built by Egyptian troops the previous year, and while not a typical high walled fort, it was nonetheless a strong defensive position. In two days Graham stockpiled over 36,000 litres of water, and by 28 February the remainder of his force had concentrated there.

  The British infantry were armed with the Martini Henry single shot breech-loading rifle and bayonet. The cavalry were armed with sword and carbine. Infantry wore khaki drill, but Highlanders wore grey jackets and kilts. All wore pith helmets.

  GENERAL GRAHAM’S FORCE

      • Cavalry Brigade (Major General Sir Herbert Stewart):

        10th Hussars (328);

        19th Hussars (410);

        Mounted Infantry (126); and

        artillery – six 7-pounders, ten mountain

        guns, four 9-cm Krupps guns (126).

      • 1st Brigade (Major General Sir Redvers Buller, VC):

        King’s Royal Rifles (610);

        Gordon Highlanders (751); and

        Royal Irish Rifles (334).

      • 2nd Brigade (Major General John Davis):

        Black Watch (Royal Highlanders) (761);

        York and Lancaster Regiment (600*);

        Royal Marine Light Infantry (RMLI) and Royal Marine Artillery (RMA) (361);

        Royal Engineers (80);

        Medical Corps (50*); and

        camel and mule transport (1200 animals).

      • Naval Brigade (Commander Ernest Neville Rolfe):

        62 men, two 9-pounders, three Gatling guns.

        * - estimate.

  The Second Battle of El Teb

  The next day, Friday 29 February 1884, Reveille was sounded at 0500 and Graham’s force moved out of Fort Baker in an oblong formation, the front and rear being much longer than the sides owing to the strength of the regiments. The Gordon Highlanders in line led the advance, with two Gatling guns and a Gardner in the right corner, and a Gatling in the left corner. Inside the square were Graham and Buller’s staffs, together with Royal Engineer officers and personnel of the Medical Department.

  The Mahdist strength was estimated at about 6000, many armed with Remington rifles. When Graham reached El Teb, the site of the defeat of Baker’s force 15 days earlier, enemy scouts were seen to withdraw suddenly. Just after 1100, Mahdist artillery opened fire from prepared positions, and this was followed by a wild charge into the British square. The Mahdists quickly established a reputation among Graham’s force for reckless bravery.

  By 1400 the fighting was all but over, as Osman Digna’s men fled towards Tokar, having lost 2500 killed. Graham’s hussars were lured into pursuing what they thought was an undisciplined retreating enemy force, but as they charged, the enemy crouched in the prickly scrub, hamstrung the horses, and stabbed any fallen riders. The cavalry paid dearly for this tactical error, and sustained 20 killed and 48 wounded. After the battle, Graham’s men noted rifle pits and shallow trenches around the enemy’s defensive positions. Osman Digna was learning too.

  The road to Metemmeh. Contemporary sketch showing a Nordenfelt gun in action. Source: G.A. Henty, The Dash for Khartoum: A Tale of Nile Expedition, Blackie, London, 1892.

  The night before the Battle of Tamai. Contemporary sketch. Source: Illustration by Frederick Villiers, the war reporter for the London Graphic. Source: The Graphic.

  Graham’s force lost 188 killed and wounded, and two Victoria Crosses were awarded for this action. He pushed on to Tokar and on 2 March relieved its starving garrison. Graham’s force also recaptured four artillery pieces, a Gatling gun, and rifles and ammunition looted from Baker. Most of his force was then tasked with burying the decomposing bodies of the dead from Baker’s force. After destroying the fortifications, Graham withdrew to the safety of Suakin with the 70 survivors from Tokar.

  Osman Digna (with about 8000 followers) continued to defy Graham from his new headquarters at Tamanieb. Despite careful caching, Graham’s force had only three days’ supply of water. As he had been denied the wells at Tamai, it was highly risky for him to proceed to Tamanieb, as there was no intelligence about the state of the well there. If there was no water, the British would lose all their transport animals, and probably some of their men, to thirst.

  Graham’s objective was to advance to Osman Digna’s camp at Tamai. To do this he would deploy a force of almost 3500. It would advance in two squares, supported by cavalry and mounted infantry units over 730 strong. The force would cover the 25 kilometres to Tamai in short stages, erecting defensive zarebas at each stop. During the march dozens of soldiers, especially the Highlanders, suffered from heat exposure, with some having to be evacuated to Suakin. Each soldier carried 100 rounds of ammunition, besides his rifle and a full kit.

  The British would make the most of thick, spiky, Mimosa brush to construct their defensive zarebas, which were about a metre high and two metres wide. However, they could easily be set alight by enemy scouts, who would then exploit the resulting smoke screen.

  During this time attempts were made to persuade local tribes to fight against Osman Digna. Hewett and Graham issued a joint proclamation on 5 March offering an amnesty. It had no effect, however, and was followed by a second proclamation by Hewett, on 16 March, which included the offer of 5000 American dollars for the capture of Osman Digna, dead or alive.

  The First Battle of Tamai

  At 0800 on 13 March, Graham ordered General Stewart to deploy two squadrons of his cavalry brigade to skirmish while the leading infantry brigade (the 2nd) advanced on Tamai. The other units that made up the rest of the square formation found it increasingly difficult to keep up, and gaps appeared. The front face, bayonets fixed, continued to advance rapidly but the gaps behind increased.

  Apparently Graham failed to notice, but the Mahdists did. They exploited this development, and rapidly moved in with spears and swords. The naval brigade, wedged between the Highlanders and the Royal Marines, could not deploy its 9-pounders and Gatling guns. As troops were pushed back and crammed against each other, they found it difficult to use their personal weapons.

  Fortunately, enfilade fire from the 1st Brigade on the right, and fire from dismounted cavalry on the left flank, stopped what was the start of a rout. The 2nd Brigade re-formed, and with a resupply of ammunition, advanced again to retake several artillery pieces that had been captured.

  Despite a renewed attack by the Mahdists, and fire from a captured Gatling gun, the enemy began to withdraw. The 1st and 2nd Brigades advanced over a ravine to reach the high ground some 700 metres further on, which overlooked Tamai.

  After reaching the village, Graham reformed his force at 1030 and advanced to a collection of wells five kilometres away. British casualties were 91 killed, 111 wounded, and 18 missing. Osman Digna’s force lost 3000 killed, of about 9000 men. Two Victoria Crosses were awarded for this engagement, indicating the ferocity of the fighting.

  The force returne
d to Suakin after destroying all enemy camps and stores in the vicinity. Osman Digna was still on the run, and although the British had put a price on his head, it was not until many years later that he was captured, in 1900.

  The fighting highlighted the importance of having adequate supplies of water at hand. Its absence, and the logistic footprint required to maintain mobile supplies, made forces deployed in the Sudan vulnerable.

  Graham then planned his next offensive against Osman Digna. He would move on and capture two strategic sites in the nearby Tamanieb Valley to the northwest. These were the wells at Handoub and Otao, both of which lay along the traditional camel route to Berber. While both villages were burnt over the next few days the enemy was elusive, and remained a potent threat locally.

  On his return to Suakin, Graham was ordered to embark for Egypt on 3 April 1884 with his entire force, minus two battalions left as a garrison force. Preliminary plans to reach Gordon in Khartoum from Suakin via Berber had been stopped by adverse intelligence estimates of available water supplies and a risk averse government in London.

  After the victory at Tamai the British government could have ordered Graham to secure his area of operations along the Suakin-Berber route. This would have prevented Gordon from being totally isolated by Mahdist forces. Now, at the same time as British troops were being withdrawn from Suakin, the situation in Khartoum deteriorated, and communications with Gordon became increasingly sporadic.

  Among the mountains near Handoub. Contemporary sketch. Source: John Grant, Cassell’s History of the War in the Soudan, Volume IV, Cassell, London, 1885, p.128.

  A new plan to relieve Khartoum

  In April 1884 the British government at last stirred itself, and a start was made on a comprehensive operational plan to deploy an effective military force to Khartoum. It would have a minimum strength of 6500 troops, including two brigades of infantry. They would be deployed around Shendi, a town approximately midway between Khartoum and Berber on the Nile.

  CANADIAN VOYAGEURS

  An important part of the logistic support provided to Wolseley’s Nile Expedition was the use of Canadian voyageurs. These men were experts in rowing large boats, poling, and keeping loaded boats under control in white water rapids. On 29 October 1884, 387 Canadians (including 77 Caughnawaga Indians) under Lieutenant Colonel Frederick Denison, arrived in Wadi Halfa. Their first task was to deploy to the Nile’s second cataract (which is now submerged under Lake Nasser). This posed a significant navigational hazard for military units moving up the Nile by boat. During the campaign six voyageurs drowned and a further eight died from disease.

  The Canadian Voyageurs’ first touch of the Nile, The Graphic, London, November 22, 1884.

  The rationale was that while Berber and Dongola remained under government control, a force advancing to relieve Gordon in Khartoum would be unlikely to meet serious opposition until reaching Shendi. When Berber’s garrison surrendered to rebel forces on 26 May, however, Khartoum was cut off from the outside world. This removed the strategic imperative for a British advance along the Suakin-Berber route.

  Previously, in April, Wolseley and his advisors had considered three courses of action for an advance, the first two using the Nile:

  1.  Massawa to the junction of the Nile at Atbara, near Berber: 970 kilometres.

  2.  Wadi Halfa to Berber: 1071 kilometres.

  3.  Suakin to Berber: 394 kilometres.

  Each had its own challenges:

  1.  This plan would require 5000 camels and take 11 weeks.

  2.  This option was supposed to be the least difficult for transporting the forces, and drinking water was not such an issue. It was also believed (wrongly) that the Nile was easily navigable along key stretches of the river.

  3.  There were few sources of water.

  Wolseley’s appreciation was that the latest Gordon could hold out in Khartoum was 15 November 1884. This meant that any relief force would have to be in place at Berber no later than 20 October. Alternatively, if the government decided on the Suakin route west from the coast, the relief force would have to rendezvous there on 1 September. Gordon favoured the Suakin to Berber option.

  The Commander-in-Chief of the British Army of Occupation in Egypt, Lieutenant General Sir Frederick Stephenson, also favoured the Suakin-Berber option, but using a larger force of 10,000 men. Not only was the Suakin route shorter than any other, but a firm base could be established there, four and a half days’ sailing from Cairo. This would allow a faster concentration of the force, better transport (especially for the supply of fresh rations), and safer casualty evacuation. The presence of warships in the harbor would impress local tribal leaders, giving a psychological advantage.

  Stephenson considered that the cataracts and rapids of the upper Nile posed too great a logistics challenge, and estimated any force using this route to Khartoum would take four months, not 11 weeks. He considered that the Suakin to Berber option would take only nine weeks. A special report from the Admiralty also strongly advised against the Nile route. However, a further report by three of Wolseley’s own senior commanders (drawing on their personal experience of campaigning by river in Canada) opted for the Nile plan.

  The British government still could not make a decision, and it was not until 14 June that it settled on the Suakin option, and determined that a railway should be built to Berber to transport troops there. Nevertheless, it continued to explore all options. On 24 August,

  British authorities in Cairo received a telegram from Gordon in Khartoum, stating that he had sent Lieutenant Colonel Stewart by steamer to Cairo to give the government there Gordon’s appreciation of the situation in the Sudan.

  On 9 September Wolseley arrived in Cairo to lead a British force of about 6000 up the Nile River to Wadi Halfa (a distance of almost 1280 kilometres, which would take three weeks). This plan was chosen because Wolseley believed that, as Berber was probably in Mahdist hands (it had in fact surrendered to the Mahdists in May), the deployment of a force from Suakin was not viable. Wolseley had also asked the War Office to organise a Camel Corps (approximately 94 officers and 1490 other ranks), consisting of four regiments

  These arrived at Alexandria on 7 October. While the Camel Corps was an important strategic asset, it caused a logistics problem, as its 1200 men could not carry their own food to the fighting base. Additional fodder also had to be found for the animals. Perhaps their greatest tactical advantage was that camels could move almost noiselessly by day and night.

  The only area still under government control in the south was around Dongola. To reach it, Wolseley’s force would have to deploy in several stages. The first was from Cairo to Asuyt, a distance of 368 kilometres by rail. The second stage was from Asyut to Aswan, 511 kilometres using water transport. From there the Nile River had several unnavigable cataracts. Wolseley’s line of communication from Cairo to Dongola was thus extremely long, and difficult to protect and maintain. The rate of progress of his army would depend on logistics support keeping up with the main body.

  Stewart’s force crossing the desert, unknown artist, 1885, oil painting. Courtesy National Army Museum, London. NAM. 1978-08-97-1.

  COMPOSITION OF THE CAMEL CORPS:

    •  the Guards Regiment, drawn from the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Grenadier Guards, 1st and 2nd Coldstream Guards, 1st and 2nd Scots Guards, and the 10th Royal Marine Light Infantry (RMLI);

    •  the Heavy Regiment, drawn from the 1st and 2nd Life Guards, the Royal Horse Guards, the 2nd, 4th and 5th Dragoon Guards, 1st and 2nd (Scots Greys) Dragoons, and 5th and 16th Lancers;

    •  the Light Regiment, drawn from the 3rd 4th, 7th, 10th, 11th, 15th, 18th, 20th and 21st Hussars; and

    •  the Mounted Infantry Regiment, drawn from the 1st Sussex (35th), 1st South Staffordshires (38th), 1st Black Watch Highlanders (42nd), 2nd Duke of Cornwall’s Light Infantry (46th), 1st Royal West Kents (50th), 2nd Essex (56th), 3rd King’s Royal Rifle Corps (60th), 1st Gor
don Highlanders (75th), 2nd Rifle Brigade, 1st Somerset Light Infantry (13th), 2nd Connaught Rangers (94th) and 1st Royal Scots Fusiliers (21st).

  On 5 October Wolseley and his staff reached Wadi Halfa. He was told that two days previously Lieutenant Colonel Stewart’s steamer had been wrecked, and that Stewart had been murdered. It took a further two weeks before Wolseley could concentrate a mounted force (a cavalry regiment and the Camel Corps) at Al Debbah in advance of his infantry. The infantry could then move directly across the desert to Khartoum.

  Wolseley arrived in Dongola on 3 November. There, 11 days later, he received a telegram from Gordon, informing him that the city could hold out only for another 40 days. During this period Wolseley had to wait for the remainder of his force and supplies to reach him by boat. He next planned to concentrate a force of 8000 men at Korti, with a view to advancing to Shendi.

  Wolseley set up his headquarters at Korti on 16 December. While stores had been stockpiled, the amount of forage required for the transport camels had been greatly underestimated, and this seriously limited the capability of Wolseley’s force. There were other issues too: a shortage of camel saddles and local camel drivers. Wolseley still wanted to advance on Khartoum by splitting his force into two, and approach by land and water.

  The newly raised Camel Corps would make its way from Korti to Metemmeh, where it would detach a small force to proceed by river steamer to support Gordon until help arrived. However this Desert Column (led by Brigadier General Stewart) did not deploy until 30 December. It established a forward base at Jakdul Wells, half way across the Bayuda Desert.